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Abstract. With the development of the Internet, new kinds of massive epidemics, distributed attacks,
virtual conﬂicts and criminality have emerged. We present a study of some striking statistical properties
of cyber-risks that quantify the distribution and time evolution of information risks on the Internet, to
understand their mechanisms, and create opportunities to mitigate, control, predict and insure them at
a global scale. First, we report an exceptionnaly stable power-law tail distribution of personal identity
losses per event, Pr(ID loss ≥V ) ∼ 1/V b, with b = 0.7 ± 0.1. This result is robust against a surprising
strong non-stationary growth of ID losses culminating in July 2006 followed by a more stationary phase.
Moreover, this distribution is identical for diﬀerent types and sizes of targeted organizations. Since b < 1,
the cumulative number of all losses over all events up to time t increases faster-than-linear with time
according to  t1/b, suggesting that privacy, characterized by personal identities, is necessarily becoming
more and more insecure. We also show the existence of a size eﬀect, such that the largest possible ID losses
per event grow faster-than-linearly as ∼S1.3 with the organization size S. The small value b  0.7 of the
power law distribution of ID losses is explained by the interplay between Zipf’s law and the size eﬀect. We
also infer that compromised entities exhibit basically the same probability to incur a small or large loss.
1 Introduction
The Internet has developed into a global system of in-
terconnected computer networks that allows the exchange
of data between millions of private and public, academic,
business, and government organizations. By making possi-
ble new forms of social interactions as well as new ways to
probe them, the Internet provides a unique tool for study-
ing the development and the organization of an archetyp-
ical complex system.
But, as in all complex biological and social systems
known to us, upgrades of capacity, improved networking
and additions of functionalities come together with its
bundle of parasites, viruses and criminals. We ask what
are the laws, in any, codifying these dynamics, and what
are the possible roles and consequences of such apparently
negative developments?
In biology, there is a growing realization that evolution
has been driven and shaped by bacteria and viruses [1].
Similarly, social organizations, which are founded on laws
and regulations, and which are anchored on national (as
well as sub- and super-national) boundaries, have ar-
guably been shaped in signiﬁcant part by the need to co-
ordinate and cooperate in the face of disruptions emerging
from within and from the outside. In this vein, we ask what
may the exploding level of criminality and of unlawful
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exploitation of the Internet teach us on the organization
of other complex systems? Are there robust dynamics or
universal laws that can be inferred and tested? What does
the fact, that electronic crime has appeared and developed
concommittantly with the growth of the Internet, teach us
on its organization, its vulnerabilities and its future devel-
opment?
Given the breadth of these questions, our contribution
is to focus on a speciﬁc criminality which is now becom-
ing rampant, the theft of personal information (ID thefts).
Using the most complete dataset from the Open Security
Foundation [2], we are able to identify an explosive growth
of ID losses followed by a regime which seems to have ma-
tured into a stationary phase. We document a very heavy-
tailed power-law distribution (an often reported hallmark
of complex systems) of severities of ID theft events, which
is robust over all time periods and across diﬀerent types of
social organizations (private and public). By quantifying
the scaling of losses as a function of organization sizes, we
unearth a signiﬁcant size eﬀect.
2 Maturation and severity of ID losses:
non-stationary and stationary properties
2.1 Contextual data description
From early (gentle) hackers breaking in systems to demon-
strate their skills, some turned into seasoned “black hats”
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making money as part of an explosively growing business
based on ubiquitous Internet insecurity [3,4]. Compared
with the attacks that used to disrupt networks on a large
scale, most electronic attacks nowadays extract out valu-
able data while remaining quite furtive [5]. This can be
likened to an electronic form of massive parasitism. In
terms of monetary value and volume, one of the largest
types of data targeted by pirates is personal identity infor-
mation (ID), such as credit card numbers, social security
numbers, banking accounts, and medical ﬁles. Since each
ID theft or leakage is a “loss of control” of one’s individual
private data, it can be considered already as a damaging
event, forerunning the potential realized ﬁnancial and/or
social losses [6]. Actually, stealing ID’s is the goal which
is common to a wide spectrum of non-destructive Inter-
net attacks focused on proﬁt, from botnets to highly tai-
lored attacks [7–10]. The (uncontrolled) dissemination of
personal information raises the important social issue of
people’s identity resilience in the information technology
era [5,6]. In our quantitative study of cyber-risks, we take
a ID theft as a usable elementary unit of cyber-risks, for
two main reasons. First, it provides a natural metric of the
“permeability” of information systems, guiding towards
the identiﬁcation of the underlying mechanisms. Second,
it oﬀers a common basis, or currency, to compare a large
variety of heterogeneous events involving many diﬀerent
types of organizations.
ID loss event data have been thoroughly collected by
several independant organizations. We use the most com-
plete dataset from the Open Security Foundation [2], that
contains 956 documented events reported mainly in the
USA between year 2000 and November 2008. The cata-
log provides also the involved organization, the date and
amount of loss (measured as the numbers of ID stolen).
Data are homogeneously sampled among various types of
organizations: business (35%), education (30%), govern-
ments (24%) and medical institutions (10%). We deﬁne an
event following the procedure described in reference [2,14].
For instance, the largest entries in the data set are (i) the
discovery and disclosure of an attack over several years of
the TJX Companies with a probable exposition of more
than 90 millions IDs (end of the event: January 2007), (ii)
the Cardsystems’ hack impacting 40 million Visa, Mas-
terCard and American Express cardholders (June 2005),
(iii) America Online (30 million credit card ID exposed
in 2004), and (iv) the US Department of Veterans Aﬀair
(more than 25 million of ID stolen in 2006).
An important issue is that of the reliability and
the completeness of the catalog. First, each of the
956 documented events has been conﬁrmed at least
by one major media source and/or by an oﬃ-
cial statement issued by the government. This pub-
licly disclosed information is easily traceable and
peer-reviewable (cf. http://datalossdb.org/primary_
sources). Note also that www.datalossdb.org (or its pre-
decessor www.attrition.org) is recognized as the most
complete dataset by practitioners ranging from com-
puter scientists to lawyers (see e.g. William Roberds and
Stacey L. Schreft, Data Breaches and Identity Theft,
Federal Reserve of Altanta, Working Paper, 2008, and Jari
Raman, Computer Law & Security Report, 2008). This
suggests that reported events have rather reliable docu-
mented characteristics: the dates of occurrence, the loca-
tions and the severity of the events are thoroughly doc-
umented by concordant and independent sources. While
some reporting errors are bound to exist as in any
database, the metrics that we use are generally well-known
and disclosed by the organizations themselves, in confor-
mity with the data breach notiﬁcation act adopted since
2003 by the large majority of states in the US.
Another issue is that of completeness (i.e., unreported
events) but, as we discuss below, our analysis suggests that
the catalog of the Open Security Foundation provides a
reasonable representative sample of the overall activity of
ID thefts occurring on the Internet and especially for the
US, for the most important events in terms of the number
of ID thefts. Furthermore, random errors or censorship in
a database generated by a power law distribution do not
lead to biases as the empirical distribution converges to-
wards the true distribution. Actually, our analysis suggests
a quantiﬁcation of the degree of incompleteness, which we
ﬁnd all the more acute, the smaller is the event. By propos-
ing a quantitatively falsiﬁable hypothesis for the distribu-
tion of ID thefts, our analysis provides strong incentive
for the development of even better databases. As in many
other ﬁelds of investigation before, it is the never ending
back and forth iteration between data base improvements
pushed by new insights provided by analysis and the new
tests developed by the analysis that pushed knowledge
forward.
More deeply, even if the reported events in
www.datalossdb.org are traceable or peer-reviewable, it
is important to realize that the database construction is
based entirely on voluntary eﬀorts, with no forcing func-
tion that convinces involved parties to contribute. As a
result, one may worry that the observed characteristics
might be an artifact of how the database was populated
over time and by whom. This issue is actually charac-
teristic of the so-called open-source approach versus the
economically-based control approach. The question is to
assess the quality and reliability of those voluntary con-
tributions that are intrinsic to the open source approach,
as opposed to scientiﬁcally organized top-down database
and project constructions. It turns out that this question
is not speciﬁc to www.datalossdb.org but is now investi-
gated in an exploding literature concerned with the pros
and cons of open source approaches and with the moti-
vations of open source contributors. Overall, studies have
shown that the open source model is more and more en-
dorsed by industry as a viable complementary business ap-
proach as well as source of important information [11,12].
We will cite a single representative example for illustra-
tion, Wikipedia, a free online encyclopaedia that anyone
can edit. A study of 42 entries by Nature magazine on
December 14, 2006 put Wikipedia almost on a par with
Britannica in terms of accurate science coverage [13]. Na-
ture found that the average science entry in Wikipedia
had four errors while Britannica had three.
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Fig. 1. (Color online) (A) The rate of ID loss events in slid-
ing windows of ﬁfty days is plotted as a function of time, re-
vealing the existence of two successive regimes: (i) explosive
growth culminating in July 2006 (red thick line) and (ii) sta-
ble rate thereafter (blue thin line). As a matter of comparison,
the dashed line represents the rescaled evolution of the rate
of new software vulnerabilities. The Spearmann rank correla-
tion between vulnerabilities and ID losses (ρ = 0.64 ) conﬁrms
the common trend of cyber risks. The inset shows the plot of
the logarithm rate of ID loss events as a function of t. Before
the peak the line is upward curved, which conﬁrms an accel-
erated growth before July 2006. The noisy upward curvature
suggests a faster-than-exponential growth before July 2006 (an
exponential growh would be qualiﬁed by a straight line in the
log-lin plot). The black line is a guide showing the upward cur-
vature followed by a plateau. (B) Scatter proxies of probability
density functions (PDF) of the size of events obtained in slid-
ing windows of 100 days duration. PDFs obtained by binning
or with the adaptive Gaussian kernel density estimator [35]
provide similar results. The size of an event is deﬁned as the
total number of IDs lost in that event. For the sake of clarity,
we show only one PDF out of every ﬁfty PDFs. Red diamonds
(respectively blue crosses) correspond to the PDFs obtained
before (respectively after) the peak in July 2006.
2.2 Transition from explosive growth to statistical
stationarity
The total rate C(t) of ID theft events (measured by the
number of events in a sliding window of 50 days) is shown
in the top panel of Figure 1 as a function of time. This
panel reveals the existence of two distinct phases. Start-
ing from 2000, one can observe a dramatic increase of the
rate of attacks up to a peak reached in July 2006, followed
by a plateau thereafter. The inset shows a non-parametric
evidence suggesting that the ﬁrst regime was character-
ized by a strong bursty acceleration, perhaps faster-than-
exponential growth as suggested by the upward curvature
observed before July 2006 in this linear-logarithmic plot
(note that a straight line would qualify an exponential
growth). Such singular behavior characterized by a tran-
sient explosive growth, which can be mathematically mod-
eled by a power law with ﬁnite-time singularity, is often
the diagnostic of an impending change of regime [15–17],
which we indeed observe beyond the peak in July 2006. It
suggests to interpret the time evolution of the rate of ID
loss events as ﬁrst undergoing a non-sustainable growth
followed by a maturity period which characterizes the
present epoch.
As a veriﬁcation step supporting our claim that the
behavior shown in Figure 1 is not spurious and does
not result from reporting biases, we compared normal-
ized ID losses with the time series of new vulnerabilities,
which are systematically recorded by the US-CERT (see
http://www.us-cert.gov/cve.html).The dashed line in
Figure 1 shows the rate of recorded software vulnerabili-
ties rescaled so as to be comparable to the ID loss time
series. We use the Spearman rank correlation to measure
the dependence between the rate of ID losses and that of
the vulnerabilities and obtain ρ = 0.64. This shows that
the dynamics of ID losses is consistent with another coarse
grained measure of cyber insecurity. In doing so, we do not
claim any direct causality between vulnerabilities and ID
losses, but rather propose that the two time series reﬂect
the same underlying growth of cyber-risks.
The lower panel of Figure 1 demonstrates that the dis-
tribution pdf(V ) of event sizes (deﬁned as the total num-
ber of ID stolen in that event) has remained stable, within
statistical ﬂuctuations, over the whole time period inves-
tigated here from 2000 to Nov. 2008. There is no signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerence between the probability density functions
(PDF) in the growth regime before July 2006 (red circles)
and during the maturity period (blue diamonds), as evi-
denced by the perfect collapse of the PDFs. Indeed, Q-Q
plots of one sample as a function of other samples and in
function of the entire sample, were found to be approx-
imately linear with slope slope ≈0.9 ± 0.3. This simple
non-parametric test is particularly important to ensure a
robust interpretation of the data, which is reported ac-
cording to a “best eﬀort” principle, but without warranty
of missed events or inaccuracies, given our remarks in sec-
tion 2.1. This test supports the robustness of the PDFs of
event sizes over time, independently of the event rates. It
also contributes to developing some trust in the hypothe-
sis that the PDFs of event sizes have an asymptotic power
law shape. This suggests that the mechanism underlying
the loss of ID has remained stable, notwithstanding the
enormous evolutions that have occurred over this whole
time period.
The two pieces of information provided by the two pan-
els of Figure 1 imply that the rate N(V, t) of events of size
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V occurring at time t can be factorized under the form
N(V, t) = C(t) · pdf(V ), (1)
where C(t) and pdf(V ) constitute two independent con-
tributors to cyber-risks. The macro-variable C(t) embod-
ies the overall evolution of the level of threat associated
with ID losses. In other words, it provides a metric quanti-
fying the systemic “state of insecurity” of the Internet. In
contrast, pdf(V ) measures the relative frequency of large
versus small ID losses. While the rate of attacks has varied
enormously between 2000 and 2008 as shown by the be-
havior of C(t) in the upper panel of Figure 1, the relative
frequencies of various event sizes has remained remarkably
stable, as shown in the lower panel of Figure 1. We now
turn to the determination of pdf(V ) in order to charac-
terize quantitatively the level of cyber risks per event.
3 Distribution of ID theft event sizes
and consequences
3.1 Power-law versus stretched exponential
Given the result of the previous section that a unique dis-
tribution pdf(V ) is suﬃcient to describe the frequency of
event sizes in all time windows from 2000 to 2008, we
now determine pdf(V ) by using the largest possible sta-
tistical sample including all events of this period. Fig-
ure 2 presents the (non-normalized) empirical survival
(also called complementary cumulative) distribution func-
tion F¯u(V ), deﬁned as the probability that the number of
victims in a given event is larger than or equal to V in
the range V ≥ u. Note that F¯u(V ) has a shape similar
to the PDFs shown in the lower panel of Figure 1 with
an approximately straight tail in this double-logarithmic
scale, suggesting a power law distribution
F¯u(V ) =
( u
V
)b
, for V ≥ u. (2)
This power law (2) is observed over more than three
decades above the lower threshold u ≈ 7 × 104. A maxi-
mum likelihood estimation (MLE) of the exponent deter-
mines b = 0.7±0.1. If model (2) is a correct description of
the survival distribution, then pdf(V ) ∼ 1/V 1+b, which
is shown as a straight line with slope −1.7 in the lower
panel of Figure 1. This result suggests that ID thefts have
statistics similar to those observed in the large class of
systems with heavy-tails, such as ﬁrm and city sizes in
the social sciences or earthquakes and other calamities in
the natural sciences.
However, visual evidence and MLE are not suﬃcient to
demonstrate that the power law (2) is adequate to describe
our statistical data of ID thefts, as discussed in several
earlier works [18–20]. To prove that the one-parameter
power law (2) is suﬃcient, we embed it into a broader
two-parameter law that have previously been reported to
provide a ﬂexible model of many empirical fat-tailed dis-
tribution [18] and perform a standard log-likelihood ratio
(Wilks) test. Speciﬁcally, we use the “stretched exponen-
tial” (SE) family
F¯u(V ) = exp
[
−
(
V
d
c)
+
(u
d
c)]
, for V ≥ u, (3)
where c and d are respectively the shape and scale param-
eters of the SE distribution. Malevergne et al. [20] have
shown that the power law family (2) is asymptotically em-
bedded in this SE family in the limit
c
(u
d
)c
→ b, as c → 0. (4)
This has two practical applications: (i) the calibration of
c and d for a given u provides an alternative determina-
tion (using (4)) of the exponent b of the power law (2) if
c is indeed small (typically less than 0.3); (ii) we can use
the formal likelihood ratio test of embedded hypotheses
which has been shown to hold for the power law seen as
asymptotically embedded in the SE family [20,21], to de-
termine whether the one-parameter power law is suﬃcient
or a two-parameter distribution like the SE is necessary.
Inset (a) in Figure 2 shows the estimated exponent b ob-
tained from the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) of
c and d translated into b via the equation bSE = c(u/d)c
derived from (4), as a function of the lower threshold u.
For u ≥ 7 × 104, we obtain an excellent conﬁrmation of
the value b  0.7±0.1 determined from the direct MLE of
the power law (2). Inset (b) in Figure 2 shows in addition
the logarithm of the likelihood ratio (LLR) of the power
law versus the SE ﬁts: for u < 7 × 104, LLR < 0 indicat-
ing that the power law is not suﬃcient and that the SE is
necessary; in contrast, for u ≥ 7 × 104, the power law is
suﬃcient and the SE is not necessary, degenerating into
the power law as the condition (4) becomes valid.
3.2 Evidence for incompleteness of reported losses
for small event sizes
We now discuss two possible hypotheses for the observed
cross-over at u ≈ 7 × 104 below which the distributions
shown in the lower panel of Figure 1 and in Figure 2 ex-
hibit a signiﬁcant downward curvature characterizing a
deviation from the power law (2).
A ﬁrst possible interpretation is that this deviation
from the power law reﬂects the fact that hackers are pref-
erentially targeting large organizations oﬀering substan-
tial potential gains. As a consequence, there would be
practically no ID thefts involving only a few individu-
als. This hypothesis does not stand closer scrutiny: there
is strong evidence that millions of home computers are
compromised [8] via the use of botnet deployment mech-
anisms centrally managed by pirates [7], with each com-
puter infection being a unique event potentially leading
to ID thefts limited to those IDs which are stored in
the computer. According to Vinton Cerf, 100−150 mil-
lions computers over a total of 600 millions are compro-
mised [22]. As a rough estimation, assuming that all com-
puters have about the same probability of being infected
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Fig. 2. (Color online) Non-normalized survival distribution
(double logarithmic scale) of ID losses, constructed using the
data provided in [2] the straight black line is the ﬁt with the
power law (2) with b = 0.7 for number of victims larger that
the lower threshold u = 7× 104. The red dashed line is the ﬁt
with the Stretched Exponential (SE) deﬁned by expression (3).
Inset (A) shows the dependence of the index b as a function of
u obtained directly from the maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE) of the exponent of the power law (2) (crosses) and indi-
rectly from the MLE of the parameters c, d of the stretched ex-
ponential (SE) law (3) using the correspondence bSE = c(u/d)
c
(diamonds) as described in the text. The horizontal line is at
b = 0.68. Inset (B) shows the logarithm of the likelihood ratio
(LLR) of the power law versus the SE ﬁts, which converges
to 0 as u increases, thus demonstrating that the simple one-
parameter power law is suﬃcient and the two-parameter SE
law is not necessary to explain the tail of the data set. The
two grey lines delineate the 95% conﬁdence interval obtained
by bootstrap.
and counting one computer per Internet user, this implies
that about one sixth of US computers are exposed. Thus,
about 50 millions US citizen are constantly exposed to at-
tacks targeting their own computer. Such events should
thus provide a huge population of small ID theft events’
which is absent from even the most complete dataset of
the Open Security Foundation [2].
3.3 Super-linear growth of the ID loss threat
There is another remarkable consequence deriving
straightforwardly from the power law (2) with exponent
b < 1. Indeed, the smallness of the power law exponent
b < 1 implies a typical faster-than-linear growth of cu-
mulative losses with time. Because b < 1 and since (i)
there is no upper threshold yet relevant and (ii) the lower
threshold u ≈ 7× 104 remains stable over time, the mean
and variance of the number of ID losses per event are
mathematically inﬁnite. In practice, this means that their
values in any ﬁnite catalog exhibit growing random ﬂuc-
tuations as the number of recorded events increases, due
to the never decreasing inﬂuence of the largest event sizes.
Then, the cumulative sum V(t) of all losses over all events
up to time t is controlled by the few largest events in the
catalog [23]. This leads to a faster-than-linear growth
V(t) ∼ t1/b ≈ t1.4. (5)
This results is solely due to the statistical mechanism that,
as more events occur, some are bound to explore more
and more the tail of the heavy-tailed power law distri-
bution (2). Note this law (5) constitutes a lower bound,
which is attained only when the rate of event occurrences
is itself not growing, as seems to be the case since July
2006.
Such faster-than-linear growths due to the pure statis-
tical power law mechanism have been documented in nat-
ural hazards for losses caused by ﬂoods [24] and for the
cumulative seismic energy released at regional scales [25]
(see [23] for a detailed mathematical derivation and dis-
cussion). Given the heavy-tail nature of the distribution
of ID theft numbers per event, we should not be surprised
that the Internet appears more and more insecure and
dangerous, just as a result of this mechanism.
4 In cyber-risks, size matters
4.1 Cross-sectional universality of ID losses
We have shown that the PDF of event sizes is constant
over time. We now investigate whether there exists some
diﬀerence between the PDFs of event sizes in a cross-
sectional analysis of diﬀerent sectors of activity, which
could reveal diﬀerent vulnerability characteristics.
Our datasource uses four distinct sectors of activity:
publicly traded companies (Biz), schools and universities
(Edu), governmental agencies (Gov), and medical services
(Med). Distinct regulations and industry benchmarking
imply that organizations implement homogenous security
processes in a given sector, but these security processes
operating in a given sector are diﬀerent from those in a
diﬀerent sector. A priori, one could expect that distinct
factors acting in these diﬀerent sectors imply dissimilar
attractiveness to hackers leading to diﬀerent levels of vul-
nerability, which should be revealed in the statistical prop-
erties of the catalogs of ID losses. In contradiction with
this anticipation, the top panel of Figure 3 shows that
one cannot reject the hypothesis that the PDFs of ID loss
size per event are identical for the four sectors Biz, Edu,
Gov, Med.
If two typical organizations belonging to two diﬀerent
sectors are subjected to distinct exposition and permeabil-
ity threats, the remarkable conclusion suggested by the
top panel of Figure 3 is that the associated level of secu-
rity just compensates for the increasing threat, putting all
organizations at a similar overall risk level. This result is
reminiscent of the eﬀect documented in references [26,27],
that systems exposed to diﬀerent distributions of attacks
converge to similar level of vulnerabilities when they try
to optimize their eﬃciency in the presence of constraints.
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This could mean that organizations, which are indeed at-
tempting to optimize their defenses against cyber-risks,
may have already reached an intrinsic barrier. With the
evolving nature of the threats and given the complexity
of the associated processes in the presence of limited re-
sources, the observed level of ID losses may be a robust
dynamical equilibrium that will be diﬃcult to improve
upon. This suggests that, in absence of a fundamentally
new qualitative paradigm, these cyber-risks are bound to
remain with us for the foreseeable future.
4.2 Size eﬀects of vulnerabilities to cyber-risks
The bottom panel of Figure 3 plots the PDFs of victims
per event sorted by target organization sizes. There are
several possible measures for the size of an organization.
Here, we take the number of employees, which correlated
well with other measures [28]. The PDFs are constructed
for 269 universities [29] and 105 publicly traded compa-
nies [30]. The good collapse of the PDFs conﬁrms the uni-
versality of the power law distribution of event loss sizes,
as in Figures 1 and 2.
However, the tails of the PDFs are truncated at upper
values which seem to grow with the organization sizes.
This size eﬀect is better revealed by the scatter plot of the
inset in the bottom panel of Figure 3, which shows that the
largest losses Vmax for a given range of organization sizes S
seem to grow with S. This visual impression is conﬁrmed
by performing linear regressions of logV (q) as a function
of logS, log V (q) = σ logS + , where V (q) is the 99%
quantile of the losses for a given organization size S. We
ﬁnd a stable determination of the exponent σ ≈ 1.3± 0.1.
This means that the largest losses for a given set of entities
of size S grow with S as Vmax ∼ Sσ ≈ S1.3.
Naively, one would have expected a linear growth with
σ = 1. The faster-than-linear law may express a combina-
tion of eﬀects, which include a faster-than-linear growth
of the number of IDs stored in a given entity as a function
of its number of employees, a bigger exposition that makes
the attacks of large entities more attractive to hackers and
possibly a greater vulnerability due to more bridges or
“boundaries” with the external world which are more dif-
ﬁcult to manage. The faster-than-linear law is character-
istic of a size eﬀect which is similar to the size eﬀects doc-
umented for instance in material failure [31] and species
fragility [32].
We now show how σ is related to the exponent b of the
PDFs of event loss sizes deﬁned in (2). For this, we write
the probability Pr(ID losses ≥ V ) to ﬁnd an event with
more than V ID losses as
Pr(ID losses ≥ V ) =
∫ +∞
Smin
dSZ(S)Pr1(ID losses ≥ V |S),
(6)
where Smin is a minimum size for an organization to be
viable, and Z(S) is the distribution of organization sizes,
well-known to follow Zipf’s law (Z(S) ∼ 1/S1+μ with
μ ≈ 1) [28,33,34] so that Z(S)dS is the number of or-
ganizations with sizes between S and S + dS. Moreover,
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Fig. 3. (Color online) (A) Probabibility density functions of
the number of victims (V ) per event sorted by sector: busi-
ness (Biz), governmental agencies (Gov), schools and univer-
sities (Edu), medical industries (Med). Inset shows quantile-
quantile plot (with 5% interquantiles) of sectors taken against
each other. Linear ﬁt obtained for the presented lines show that
we cannot reject that slope = 1 , ruling out the hypothesis that
distributions are diﬀerent. (B) Probability density functions
(PDF) of victims per event sorted by sizes of the target orga-
nizations. We construct one PDF per decade in organization
sizes, i.e., we collect all events occurring for organizations of
sizes between S∗ and 10×S∗ and construct the corresponding
PDF. We then vary S∗ across the whole sample (to avoid over-
lapping we take only one out of ﬁfty PDFs). All PDFs exhibit
a good collapse, conﬁrming the universality of the power law
distribution of event loss sizes, as in Figures 1 and 2. Similarly
to presented above, by performing linear regressions of (log)
quantiles of all samples, we cannot rule out that all samples
are drawn from the same probability distribution. The inset
shows in double logarithmic scale a scatter plot of the losses
(V ) as a function of size for 374 entities. The straight line with
slope  1.3 is the best linear ﬁt (p = 0.00 and R2 = 0.74) of the
99% percentile of the logarithmic losses for both 269 universi-
ties (blue plus symbols) [29] and 105 publicly traded companies
(red crosses) [30] as a function of organization logarithmic size.
Pr1(ID losses ≥ V |S) is the probability to ﬁnd an event
with more than V ID losses in a given organization of
size S. We know one property of Pr1(ID losses ≥ V |S),
namely that it drops abruptly to vanishing values for
V > CSσ, where C is a positive constant, as documented
above. This implies that, for a ﬁxed V , all integrants with
S < (V/C)1/σ do not contribute to the integral. Motivated
T. Maillart and D. Sornette: Heavy-tailed distribution of cyber-risks 363
by the power law (2), we also assume a power law shape
for Pr1(ID losses ≥ V |S) with exponent b1. Putting all
this together, expression (6) becomes
Pr(ID losses ≥ V ) 
∫ +∞
Smin(V )
dS
S1+μ
1
Sb1
, (7)
with Smin(V ) ∼ (V/C)1/σ . This yields Pr(ID losses ≥
V ) ∼ 1/Sb1+ 1σ +(μ−1). Identifying this power law with
(2) in the tail gives b = b1 + 1σ + (μ − 1). Given that
σ ≈ 1.3±0.1, we have 1/σ ≈ 0.77±0.1. Since b = 0.7±0.1,
this calculation allows us to infer that the distribution of
ID losses for a given organization is fairly ﬂat (b1  0). In
other words, the eﬀorts necessary to get just a few or a
large number of IDs are not much diﬀerent, once an orga-
nization has been compromised. Our conclusion does not
rely sensitively on the validity of Zipf’s law. However, the
value b < 1 imposes a bound on the exponent μ of Zipf’s
law which cannot be signiﬁcantly larger than 1.
5 Conclusion
We have presented three diﬀerent tests that conﬁrm the
general validity and robustness of the probability distri-
bution of ID losses per event (where ID losses has been
taken as a proxy for information risks on the Internet). We
showed that the PDFs are the same irrespective of (i) the
growth phase before July 2006 versus stationary regime
thereafter, (ii) the sectors of activity, and (iii) the size of
targeted organisations. Returning to the questions raised
in the introduction, it is striking and a priori counter in-
tuitive to ﬁnd that all organisations are evenly vulner-
able, whatever their implemented information security.
This raises important questions concerning the tradeoﬀ
between exposition and counter-measures in the complex
evolving landscape of cyber-risks. The consequences on
the evolution of the Internet remain to be studied. This
present paper provides a ﬁrst partial approach of the study
of the development of the Internet and of cyber-risks tak-
ing into account their intricate entanglement.
We have shown the existence of a size eﬀect, such that
the largest possible ID losses per event grow faster-than-
linearly with the organization size. This has led us to de-
rive two important consequences. First, the small value
b  0.7 of the power law distribution of ID thefts is ex-
plained by interplay between Zipf’s law and the size ef-
fect. Second, we have found indirect evidence that com-
promised entities typically expose to hackers a small or
large number of IDs with basically the same frequency.
This inference is very important for the quantiﬁcation of
cyber risks and suggests that counter-measures should be
targeted towards building internal barriers, avoiding the
“Titanic” eﬀect of inadequate compartmentalization.
A limit of our study is that we have analyzed only
one class of cyber risks (ID thefts) while the subject is
much richer, including defacing home pages, hacking, ma-
licious code (such as viruses and worms), denial of ser-
vice attacks, theft of information via e.g. phishing and
other means, fraud, corruption of data, insider exploita-
tion and even cyber terrorism. However, we believe that
our conclusions are relevant and useful for several reasons.
First, identity theft is soaring and is in fact the fastest
growing crime in the US, according to the Federal Trade
Commission. Tammy J. McInturﬀ, Technology Editor at
LOMA (an international association of more than 1200
insurance and ﬁnancial services companies from over 80
countries, http://www.loma.org) reports that “ID theft
is far greater in terms of damages to business consumers
than many people actually think. Identity theft has risen
rapidly because companies have moved to larger and larger
acquisition of consumer data. This has made it easier for
a thief to not only steal one credit card number at a time,
but also 300 000 others at the same time”. There are hun-
dreds of articles in the literature (a few are quoted here),
explaining that identity or simply data thefts is today by
far the main risk on the Internet. IT Security Experts
agree that stealing data is the common denominator of
the vast majority of attacks, because they are conceal-
able. Here it is important to stress that we do not make
any assumptions on the types of attacks (which are in-
deed numerous). Finally, we end with an hypothesis, open
to falsiﬁcation as more data become available, that other
types of cyber risks will exhibit similar statistical charac-
teristics. This paper has opened a window to an impor-
tant societal question, which ought to be addressed within
a systematic scientiﬁc methodology, without waiting for
more data but pushing by its challenging conclusions for
more and better data.
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